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Abstract
This paper analyzes seller pricing behavior in retail markets. We
study the sequential equilibria of a game that takes place over a se-
quence of "market periods" with two risk neutral traders, a buyer and
a seller, with differential information. The seller's cost of producing
a unit of a fictitious good is known and constant in all market peri-
ods. The buyer's value for the good (demand) is a random variable
governed by a Markov Process whose structure is common knowledge.
At the beginning of each period the unit's value is determined by "na-
ture" and is privately revealed only to the buyer. The seller posts one
price offer each period, and the buyer either accepts or rejects it. The
market termination rule is a binary random variable. We show that
for some parametric specifications, the model generates prices that ap-
pear to be "sticky." However, because of differential information price
stickiness is an equilibrium phenomenon that is intimately related to
rational expectations. We conduct laboratory experiments to test the
theory.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon known as "price stickiness" is an important and often dis-
cussed issue in macroeconomics. In most economic sub-fields, researchers
presume that the price of a good or service adjusts to equilibrate supply and
demand. However, some economists argue that this assumption is inappro-
priate for macroeconomic analyses because some wages and prices appear to
adjust slowly. 1 Further, there is an implicit presumption that price stickiness
is bad. 2 The purpose of this paper is to provide a stochastic, intertemporal
framework in which these two aspects of price stickiness can be assessed.
Virtually any pricing behavior (including prices that are inflexible downward
and those that are "flat" for long periods of time) can be justified as "op-
timal" in a stochastic setting for some specification of agents' beliefs about
the future evolution of demand, production costs, etc. However, in most
markets agents' beliefs about future events are difficult to ascertain because
the underlying probability distributions they are based on are not well spec-
ified (i.e., are unobservable). One goal of this paper is to specify a theory of
price stickiness with empirically testable implications which explicitly links
pricing behavior to agents' beliefs. A second goal is to define price stickiness
precisely, and evaluate the traditional presumption that it is "bad."
Our analysis of firm pricing behavior and beliefs (i.e., price stickiness and
rational belief formation) requires us to consider both the institutional (game
theoretic) structure of markets and the stochastic and intertemporal nature
of trade. Thus, we consider a repeated market game designed to resemble
a retail institution (e.g., a grocery store). The buyer of a (single) fictitious
Standard examples of price stickiness are that some labor contracts are set for up to
three years while some firms leave their product prices unchanged for long periods. See
Gordon (1990) for a discussion of the literature.
2This is a traditional Keynesian presumption. Alternatively, Sargent and Wallace
(1982) and Smith (1988) have studied price flexibility versus fixed price paths, but their
emphasis is on aggregate price levels in deterministic models. In contrast, we are concerned
with pricing behavior by firms in stochastic settings.
good experiences privately observed shocks to his/her valuation of the good
over time. In contrast, the seller knows only the stochastic process that
governs the good's value to the buyer. The seller has one unit of the good
at the beginning of each period with a known and fixed cost, and posts a
take-it or leave-it price. The buyer's "shopping decision" is either to accept
or reject the seller's price each period. The seller's optimal pricing policy and
the buyer's optimal purchasing policy are derived from stochastic discounted
dynamic programming problems, and are sequential equilibria of the game.
In view of the alleged importance of price stickiness in macroeconomics,
we regard it to be essential to link theory with direct empirical evidence. This
paper, in addition to introducing a new theoretical model of firm pricing be-
havior based on rational belief formation, also provides an empirical test of
the theory. Specifically, we conduct laboratory experiments designed to an-
alyze the predictive success of the theory. We believe that controlled labora-
tory experiments may prove to be an indispensable tool for testing stochastic
intertemporal theories such as ours for two reasons. First, in our model, as
in many actual markets, the seller must form beliefs about a good's value
to a buyer because the seller's optimal pricing policy is contingent on these
(presumably rationally formed) beliefs. However, in most actual markets
the underlying probability distribution that the seller uses to form his/her
beliefs is unobservable. In laboratory experiments the probability distribu-
tion is induced and hence observed directly by the experimenter. Second,
standard econometric tests are generally joint tests of both the theory and
auxiliary assumptions about the parametric specification of the model. In
laboratory experiments alternative parametric specifications of the theory
can be induced and tested directly.3
3The rationale for laboratory experimentation is summarized by Plott (1989, p. 1169):
"General theories apply in special cases. They should therefore be expected to work in
simple laboratory environments .... By adopting this point of view, researchers can use
data from laboratory economies to reduce the size of the set of competing ideas."
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we specify a sequential trad-
ing environment that is designed to focus on the following questions regarding
price stickiness: Are price adjustments by sellers the result of rational learn-
ing about the realizations of demand shocks?4 And more fundamentally:
How do agents form beliefs and pricing/buying strategies in well specified
stochastic environments? In Section 3 we formulate the buyer's and the
seller's problems as stochastic discounted dynamic programming problems,
and derive stationary Markov strategies and equilibria of the market game.
Section 4 contains a discussion of rational Bayesian equilibrium belief for-
mation and a notion of equilibrium price stickiness. Section 5 describes the
experimental implementation of the theory and Section 6 reports the results
from laboratory experiments. Finally, Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a market with two risk neutral traders: a buyer and a seller. Trade
between the agents takes place over a sequence of periods, and the market
is organized as a Posted Offer Institution. 5 In each period, the seller may
produce one unit of an indivisible good. The seller's production cost is fixed
and common knowledge. In contrast, the buyer has a reservation value for
the good which follows a Markov Process that is common knowledge. The
unit's value to the buyer, u, can take on one of two possible values, h (high)
or / (low). The Markov Process describes the serial correlation in the unit's
value over the sequence of market periods, and has the following features:
Given the unit's value in the previous period, the probability that the unit's
value is the same in the current period is 1 — a, and the probability that it
changes (i.e., either from high to low or from low to high, given the previous
4We restrict our analysis to demand shocks for simplicity; the model is not inconsistent
with other types of shocks (e.g., cost).
5See Ketcham, Smith and Williams [1984] for a complete description of this institution.
state) is a. The unit's value to the buyer in the first period (i.e., the initial
state) is a random variable, drawn from a known uniform distribution. We
restrict attention to the case of positive serial correlation (i.e., < a < 1/2). 6
Each period trade occurs according to the following sequence of events.
At the beginning of the period the unit's value is determined by "nature"
(the value of the first unit is drawn randomly from a (known) distribution).
The value of each subsequent unit is determined by the stationary Markov
Process described above. We assume that a complete description of the
Process is common knowledge of both agents, but that the unit's current
value is privately revealed only to the buyer. The seller then posts a single
price offer. The buyer can either accept or reject the seller's price offer. If
the buyer accepts, the unit is traded at the price posted by the seller. The
buyer makes a profit on the unit equal to the difference between the unit's
(random) value for the period and the posted price. The seller makes a profit
on the unit equal to the difference between the posted price and the (known)
cost. If the buyer rejects the offer the unit is not produced and is not traded,
and both traders make zero profit. This concludes the current market period.
Whether trade occurs in the next period is determined by the following
termination rule: The probability that the market continues each period is
given by S 6 (0,1). For risk neutral traders, this is equivalent to assuming
a discount factor of S. Strictly speaking, the termination rule for the mar-
ket is the binary random variable {Continue, Stop} . In Section 3 we state
the seller's and the buyer's problems as discounted dynamic programming
problems, and < S < 1 is required for these problems to be well defined.
60f course, three other cases are possible:
(i) When a — 0, the initial draw determines the unit's value for all periods,
(ii) When a = 1/2, the unit's values are independent,
(iii) When 1/2 < a < 1, the unit's values exhibit negative serial correlation.
We ignore (i) and (ii) because they eliminate price cycles (the phenomena that motivate
our study), and (iii) because it does not correspond to Markov Processes of economic
interest (e.g., weather, oil, and monetary shocks exhibit positive serial correlation).
Fortunately, 8 is a parameter that can be specified by the experimenter via
the publicly announced termination rule. The trading and termination pro-
cedures are repeated for each subsequent period until the market ends.
3 Strategies and Equilibria
We focus on equilibria in stationary Markov strategies for the model described
in Section 2. Given the distribution of the buyer's value for the initial unit,
and a history of past price offers by the seller and answers by the buyer, the
seller forms a belief (for any equilibrium of the game) about the buyer's value
for the current unit of the good. Each period the seller considers only this
belief about the current unit's value to the buyer, and the buyer considers
only his/her own (known) value and the seller's belief about the value. Agents
consider the history of game (i.e., the sequence of previous price offers and
answers) only in so far as previous price and answer information are reflected
in the seller's current belief. To derive equilibrium strategies, we assume that
the seller's initial belief is common knowledge. 7
A stationary strategy for the seller is a map from the seller's belief to the
space of price offers. We express the seller's belief by a number w
€ [0, 1],
where w denotes the seller's subjective probability that the buyer's value for
the current unit of the good is high. A stationary strategy for the buyer
is a map from the unit's value for that period, the seller's belief, and the
seller's price offer to a binary decision variable which indicates the buyer's
answer. Appendix A shows that equilibria in stationary strategies have the
following state dependent form: An equilibrium is characterized by a triple
(ty*,/?/,;^), which indicates the seller's critical belief, the low price offer and
the high price offer, respectively. Thus, equilibrium strategies for each agent
7This assumption is induced in the experiments by drawing the first unit's value ran-
domly from a known distribution.
are a pair {p(w), A(w,p, t>)), where
( ph if w > w*\ orPM = < ,
[ p/ otherwise;
and
.. . f V if either: p < p/; or: p < ph and v = h:A(w,p,v) = <
< N otherwise.
The equilibrium strategies are a state dependent price offer by the seller de-
noted by (Ps ), and a state dependent answer by the buyer denoted by (Pb),
where Y denotes "yes" and N denotes "no." The seller's and the buyer's dy-
namic programming problems that these state dependent stationary strate-
gies are solutions to are specified in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
The equilibria of this game, given by the triple (w* ,pt,ph ), are sequential
equilibria (see Kreps and Wilson [1982]). Thus, to complete our analysis of
the equilibria we must provide a rule that the seller follows to form beliefs,
both on and off the equilibrium path. Assume that on the equilibrium path,
the seller follows Bayes rule.8 Let w'(-) denote the seller's belief that the
buyer's value for next period's unit is high. From Bayes rule, it follows that
w'(-) = w(l — a) + (1 — w)a.
This equation indicates that the value for next period's unit may be high for
two reasons: the current unit's value was high and did not change (the first
term) or was low but changed states (the second term).
The stationary strategy of each agent is binary, thus there are four pos-
sible belief situations:
(i) w'(ph, Y, w) = 1 — a: If the seller posts the high price and the buyer
accepts, then the seller believes that the unit's value is the same as in the
current period (i.e., is high),
(ii) w'{ph, TV, w) = a: If the seller posts the high price and the buyer rejects,
then the seller believes that the unit's value has changed (i.e., is low).
sw denotes the seller's belief that the buyer's value for the current unit is high.
(iii) w'(pi, Y, w) = w(l — 2a) + a = w: If the seller posts the low price and
the buyer accepts, then the seller revises his/her belief according to w.
(iv) w'(pi, N, w) = a: We assume that if the seller posts the low price and the
buyer rejects, then the seller believes the unit's value has changed.
Beliefs (i), (ii), and (iii) are equilibrium path strategies that follow directly
from w' = w(l — a) + (l — w)a. When the buyer accepts the seller's high price
offer, this is a perfect signal that v = h; thus w = 1 and w' is given by (i).
When the buyer rejects the seller's high price offer, this is a perfect signal (in
equilibrium) that v = /; thus w = and w' is given by (ii). When the buyer
accepts the seller's low price offer, this action is not perfectly revealing; thus
w' is given by (iii). Finally, (iv) is an "off the equilibrium path" strategy, so
we must attribute to the agent some belief to complete the belief specification
rule. We assume that if the buyer rejects the seller's low price offer the seller
believes v = / so w = 0. This is plausible because when v = I the buyer loses
nothing by rejecting pi but if v = h the buyer foregoes substantial profit.
3.1 The Seller's Problem
A stationary strategy for the seller is a map p: [0, 1] — 1R+ (i.e., from the
set of beliefs to the space of price offers). We assume that the seller knows
his/her own beliefs, w, and value function, V/s (-), defined over [0,1]. Let
1{a=y} denote the indicator function of the set {A = Y}, which is a random
event from the seller's perspective. Let c denote the seller's (known) cost of
producing each unit sold. 9 The seller's functional equation can be written:
Vs(w) = maxEw {pl {A=Y ) + 6V,(w'{p, A, w))},
p>0
where Ew denotes the expectation with respect to the measure w.
'The seller's cost plays no role in our analysis so we normalize c = 0.
3.2 The Buyer's Problem
A stationary strategy for the buyer is a function from beliefs, the price offer,
and the unit's current value into the answer set A £ {Y, N). We assume that
the buyer knows the realization of the unit's current value, v = h or /, takes
the seller's price and beliefs as given, and knows his/her own value function
defined over [0, 1] x M+ x {h, /} and denoted by V&(«). The buyer's functional
equation can be written:
<v-p + 8Vh{w\p,Y,w),p'{w'{p,Y,w)),v') \(A = Y;
Vhiw.p.v) = max t,„ <
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability induced by the
stochastic process for the unit's value to the buyer, conditional on v being
the current value. "Primes" denote next period's value of the variable.
4 Discussion of the Solution
The seller moves first in the sequential market game by posting a price,
but has imperfect information (both ex ante and ex post) about the value
of a sequence of units to the buyer. The seller knows his/her own cost, the
probability structure that generates the unit's sequence of values, the buyer's
previous answers, and forms a belief about the unit's value in any given
period. However, the seller does not observe directly the actual realization of
the unit in any period. The buyer moves second and responds to the seller's
price offer—after the unit's current value has been privately revealed. When
< a < 1/2 and the seller is rational (i.e., uses all available information
and Bayes rule), equilibrium strategy (P3 ) indicates that the seller behaves
as if he/she forms a belief, w, about the unit's value to the buyer, and then
decides whether to offer a high or a low price by comparing the current belief
with a critical belief, w*. 10 Thus, the seller posts a high price (ph) if w > iy*,
10 Recall that w denotes the probability that v = h.
and a low price (pi) otherwise. The seller uses this strategy both to maximize
revenue and to acquire information. Equilibrium strategy (Pb) indicates that
the buyer should accept the seller's price offer, regardless of whether it is
high or low, if the unit's value is high; but should accept only the seller's low
price offer if the value is low. Appendix A proves that strategies (P3 ) and
(Ph) are indeed solutions to the seller's problem and the buyer's problem,
respectively (cf., Lemma A.l and Lemma A. 2).
Appendix B proves existence of sequential equilibria in stationary strate-
gies of the type characterized by (Ps ) and (Pb). These strategies are incentive
compatible (cf., condition (ICC) in Theorem B.3), so the buyer's equilibrium
strategy sometimes truthfully reveals information to the seller. At first glance
this may seem odd. One may wonder why it is not optimal for the buyer to
reject the seller's high price offer when the unit's value is high in an attempt
to mislead the seller and drive down the price. Lying is not optimal because it
is costly. Condition (ICC) in Appendix B indicates that equilibrium strategy
(Pb) involves an essential tradeoff: If the buyer accepts price offer />/, this ac-
tion reveals information to the seller, but the buyer gets an immediate reward
for telling the truth (i.e., profit from the trade). If the buyer lies (by rejecting
Ph. when in fact v = h) this action distorts the seller's belief, but the cost of
lying is the profit foregone on the rejected current trade. Thus, the buyer
faces a tradeoff between current profit and manipulating the seller's beliefs
(in the hope of obtaining higher future profit)—in a sequential game with
a random termination rule and an oscillating value sequence. The seller's
equilibrium strategy (P3 ) takes this tradeoff into account as critical belief w"
depends on 8 (the termination rule) and on / and h (the oscillating values).
In the remainder of this Section, we discuss the nature of equilibrium price
paths, derive an estimate of w* in terms of 6, h and /, and discuss "price
stickiness" and rational expectations.
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4.1 Equilibrium Price Paths
An equilibrium in stationary strategies is identified with the triple (u;*, p/, ph).
If such a triple describes all equilibria, then p\ = I by the following argument:
Pi < f because if v = I then any higher price offer by the seller would be
rejected by the buyer, and the buyer would have no incentive to deviate from
this answer strategy. Clearly, p/ = / is a dominant strategy in equilibrium.
The high price offer is bounded by / < ph < h.
A key determinant of the equilibrium price path is the relationship be-
tween the critical belief w* and 1/2, where 1/2 is the probability that the
unit's value is high (or low) in the invariant measure of the Markov Process.
Note that 1/2 is also the limit belief of the seller when no new information
about the unit's value to the buyer is acquired. In fact, limt_oo w l — 1/2 for
every w. 11 Thus there are two possible cases:
(1) w* > 1/2: In this case belief region [0,u>*] prevails and is invariant.
The seller's equilibrium price offer is p/, which gives the seller no new
information about the unit's value. Hence if w £ [0, it;*] at some points,
then all subsequent beliefs remain in this interval and converge to the
limit belief 1/2. The unit's value to the buyer is equal to / in finite time
with probability one, and in the following period the seller's belief is in
[0, w*] for any previous belief. Thus, in this case prices attain the constant
level pi in finite time with probability one.
(2) w* < 1/2: In this case equilibrium prices follow a cyclical pattern for any
realization of the buyer's value process. Consider beliefs w < w* . The
seller's equilibrium price offer is p/, and the sequence of future beliefs is
given by it;', until the first time i that wl° > w' (where i is finite) when
the seller's price offer becomes p^. If the unit's value is low, the buyer
refuses the offer, the seller sets his/her new belief to a, and the process
11 Let w l denote the ith iterate of the equilibrium Bayesian belief formation rule w' —
w(l— a)+(l— w)a. Iteration shows that w' converges to 1/2 for every w when < a < 1/2.
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begins again. If the unit's value is high, the buyer accepts the offer, the
seller sets his/her new belief to 1 — a and maintains a price offer of p^
(and a belief of 1 — a) until the unit's value becomes low. Finally, when
the unit's value becomes low, the buyer rejects the offer, and a new period
of low price offers begins. The average length of the periods in which the
seller makes low price offers is constant and given by: 12
L = minju;' > w'}.
i
4.2 The Seller's Critical Belief
We now provide an estimate of the seller's critical belief, w". An exact compu-
tation is difficult because w' depends on the computation of the equilibria. 13
However, in the Lemma below we provide an estimate of w* in terms of the
known parameters h\ /, and 8. This estimate is essential for testing the the-
ory. Since w is a probability, we wish to obtain non-trivial left and right
bounds on w* between and 1. Consider the following notation:
7 = EL- ? = I 7, = ElllzB • a nd 7, = l(l ~ 6)* r ~ Ph' Zt - h(\-sy w - ph -p, +P( (i-6)' d u z i - h-i+i(i-sy
Clearly we have: z\ < Z[ < zr (\ — 6) < Zr , since p { = I and p^. < h in
equilibrium. 14 Also at w = 1 we must have, in equilibrium, ph > h(\ — 6), or
the seller would deviate and post any price below h that he/she expects the
buyer to accept with probability one. Therefore, Zr < zT .
The following Lemma provides an estimate of the seller's critical belief.
Lemma. z\ < w" < zr .
Remark. To simplify the analysis, normalize pi = I = 1. It follows from
the Lemma that if h > t§j, then w" < 1/2 so the equilibrium outcomes
12The function ( : )' is defined in Appendix A.
13 Existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies is proved in Appendix B, where
condition (A) gives restrictions on parameter values which ensure existence.
14 Unlike the low price, p/ = /, the equilibrium high price, p^, need not be unique (i.e.,
the distribution of exchange surplus is not uniquely determined).
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have persistent cycles of the nature described previously. Alternatively, if
h < 2 — 6, then it follows from the inequality in the Lemma that w' > 1/2
and equilibrium outcomes converge to the low price offer with probability
one. These results are essential for testing the theory, and are consistent
with the following intuition: When the seller believes the unit's value is
high (for h sufficiently high), the seller believes that the buyer has a large
consumer surplus available for extraction. Thus, the seller posts a high price
to increase revenue and to acquire information about the unit's value. In the
experimental analysis of the model in Section 6 we choose h to be sufficiently
high (i.e., $2.50 or $2.20) in some experiments, given / = $1 and 8 = 0.05, to
ensure that the seller has an incentive to acquire information. In equilibrium
the high price is fully revealing, so when h is high enough theory predicts the
seller pursues the cyclical pricing strategy even at the cost of some occasional
lost trades. In other experiments we choose h to be low enough (i.e., $1.50) to
ensure that it is not optimal for the seller to attempt to extract information
from the buyer, so theory predicts prices attain the constant level p\.
Proof. When 8 = 0, the seller is indifferent between posting the low or
high price if w — pi/ph- However, when 8 > price offer p^ gives the seller
additional information about the unit's value. Thus, for 6 > 0, w * < Zr .
If w satisfies 15
Pl + 8Vs (w) - 8V3 (a) - w\ph + 6(V3 (l - a) - V,(a))] = M > 0,
then w < w\ But M > ^\pt(l -8)- w(ph - 8Pl )}- so if Ph _ppff~fl_ g) >
w, then w < w'. We have shown that w' '. • —Pl\ , ,, = Zi, and this
concludes the proof.
15This equation describes the situation where the value to the seller of posting the low
price is strictly greater than the expected value of posting the high price.
13
4.3 Price Stickiness and Rational Expectations
The environment that we study has several interesting features that provide
insight into "price stickiness" in retail markets. First, observe that three
different pricing patterns can be optimal, depending on the seller's beliefs:
(i) p(w) = pc. If the seller posts only low price offers, it is always optimal for
the buyer to accept such offers (regardless of the value realization). This
"always post a low price" strategy is optimal for the seller if the seller
believes the probability that the buyer's value is high (w) is weakly below
the critical value (w*).
(ii) p(w) = ph'. If the seller posts only high price offers, it is optimal for
the buyer to accept such offers if the value is high. If the value is low,
the buyer rejects the offer. This "always post a high price" strategy is
optimal for the seller if the seller believes the probability that the buyer's
value is high (w) is always above the critical value (w*).
(iii) p{w) = (pi,ph): Price cycles (i.e., oscillations between high and low prices)
are optimal when the seller's beliefs oscillate about w" . The length of low
price cycles is given by L in Section 4.1.
The precise nature of the optimal pricing pattern depends on the seller's
beliefs, which in turn depend on the Markov Process and the buyer's deci-
sions. In general, virtually any seller pricing strategy is optimal given some
seller belief specification. Agents' beliefs about probability structures are
difficult to elicit in most markets because actual probability structures are
often unobservable. However, the Markov Process (demand shifts) in our
model can be easily controlled in a laboratory market. Our experimental
design (specified in the next Section) makes essential use of this fact.
The second interesting feature of this environment is that "price stick-
iness" can be defined precisely: We define price stickiness as a situation
where the seller's price is not immediately responsive to a change in the
buyer's demand (i.e., a value transition). The model predicts periods of "un-
14
changed" prices, and the length of these periods of "flat prices" (on average)
is endogenously determined by L. However, in contrast with the traditional
presumption that price stickiness is "bad," the non-instantaneous adjust-
ment of prices in our model is an equilibrium phenomenon; it results from
the seller's attempt to learn the realizations of the Markov Process. Further,
this equilibrium price stickiness is intimately connected with rational expec-
tations: Price changes may occur before, during, or after value transitions
because the seller's price decisions are based on rationally formed beliefs
which are endogenous to the model. 16 The full information prices, pi = I
and ph = h (where the seller captures all of the exchange surplus), provide
a benchmark for measuring the welfare loss associated with price stickiness
(or more precisely—differential information). 17
In conclusion, the differential information retail pricing model we pro-
pose has the following features. First, differential information reduces mar-
ket efficiency relative to full information when h >
^Zs because agents sys-
tematically forego trade on units for which the seller posts p^, (to acquire
information about the unit's current value) but the value is low. Second, the
buyer prefers the differential information solution (pi = I and I < ph < h) to
the full information solution because in general it allows the buyer to obtain
some exchange surplus. Finally, when information is revealed in the differen-
tial information equilibrium it is revealed truthfully—but the equilibrium is
not fully revealing (cf., case (iii) and the definition of w in Section 3). This
last feature provides insight into a criticism sometimes levied against models
with differential information. If differential information causes an economy
to achieve Pareto inferior allocations (relative to the full information case),
16The buyer's rejection of p/, determines the length of high price cycles, and L in Section
4.1 determines the length of low price cycles.
17This is the full information monopoly solution. Multiple bilateral monopoly solutions
are inapplicable because of the sequential nature of the game: the seller moves first and
posts a "take-it" or "leave-it" price. "Two-part pricing" and other intertemporal surplus
extraction schemes are also inapplicable due to the absence of commitment mechanisms.
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why don't agents willingly reveal their private information to the market
and thereby attain the Pareto superior full information allocations? In our
environment the answer is clear. A social planner is indifferent to the distri-
bution of exchange surplus, but agents are not. By not announcing the true
value, the buyer captures some exchange surplus when the seller posts the
low price and his/her value is high. 18 In contrast, under full information the
seller fully extracts all available exchange surplus.
5 Experimental Design
The trading rules of the Posted Offer Institution are reported in Ketcham,
Smith, and Williams [1984]. Our market has a single seller and a single buyer
and is conducted over a sequence of "trading periods," with a single unit of
a fictitious good each period. The trading rules specify a "two-step" decision
procedure: First, the seller privately makes a price decision and posts a
"take-it" or "leave-it" offer. Second, the buyer either accepts or rejects the
offer. We assign costs and values for the good each period in accordance with
the procedures described in Smith [1976]. The seller's cost of producing each
unit is known and equal to zero (i.e., c = 0). The buyer's value for each unit
(v) is either 1 or h. 19 The actual value in any period is determined randomly:
(i) The initial value is drawn from a known equal distribution, so the prob-
ability that the first unit's value to the buyer is high (i.e., h) is 1/2 and
the probability that it is low (i.e., 1) is 1/2.
(ii) All subsequent values are determined by a (first order) Markov Process
with the following characteristics: P(v = l\v = 1) = P(v = h\v = h) =
1 - a = 0.9, and P(v = h\v = 1) = P{v = l\v = h) = a = 0.1, where
P(-\-) denotes a conditional probability.
18This is case (iii) of the Bayesian belief formation rule in Section 3.
19 Based on the computations in the Remark in Section 4.2, price cycles will occur
whenever h > $2.10, given that / = $1 and 6 = 0.05.
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The explanation of (i) is obvious, and (ii) indicates the probability that the
current value is the same as last period's is 90 percent (so the probability v
has changed is 10 percent). In general, when a is small there is persistence
in the process so information about the unit's true value is valuable to the
seller. The invariant measure of the distribution is 1/2.
The value determination rule was publicly announced, and was induced
in the experiment by the following procedure: The experimenter rolled a 20-
sided die at the beginning of each market period. In period 1, if the outcome
was an 11 through 20 the value of the first unit was high; otherwise it was
low. In periods 2, . .
.
, end, if the outcome was a 1 through 18, the value of
the current unit was the same as last period's value; otherwise it changed.
Examples of stochastic processes were shown to subjects in the Instructions,
and they were told that the invariant measure of the process was 1/2. 20
Both the seller and the buyer knew the seller's cost (i.e., c = 0), and both
knew the value determination rule. However, the unit's current value was
privately revealed only to the buyer at the beginning of the period, but was
never revealed directly to the seller at any time during the experiment. The
fact that agents' had differential information was public knowledge.
Finally, the termination rule used in all experiments was stochastic. Sub-
jects were undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Illinois-
UC. They were told that the experiment would last between twenty minutes
and three hours, and that the final market period was uncertain and would be
determined as follows: The experimenter would roll a 20-sided die at the end
of every market period. If the outcome was a 1 the experiment would end;
otherwise it would continue for the next market period. This termination
procedure corresponds to a discount factor of 8 = 0.05.
20Subjects were told: On average about half of the values would be high and half would
be low, if the experiment lasted for many market periods. Further, there would be period-
to-period dependence in the unit's value over the course of the experiment.
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6 Experimental Results
To test the theory we conducted the following series of experiments:
(i) six experiments with inexperienced sellers and simulated buyers where
h > yzs'- equilibrium prices predicted by theory have persistent cycles;
(ii) two experiments with inexperienced sellers and simulated buyers where
h < 2 — 6: equilibrium prices predicted by theory converge to p;; and
(iii) three experiments with experienced sellers and real buyers where h > —gi
equilibrium prices predicted by theory have persistent cycles.
The series (i) and (ii) experiments were designed to investigate the seller's
actual pricing strategy when the buyer always followed equilibrium strategy
(Pi,).
21 Thus in these experiments the seller was told the buyer would ac-
cept the seller's price offer (regardless of whether it was high or low) if the
value was high, but accept only the low price if the value was low. The
goal of this paper is to provide a theory of seller pricing behavior in a well
defined stochastic environment designed to resemble a retail market. We de-
signed the series (i) and (ii) experiments to determine if there was baseline
empirical support for theoretical pricing policy (P3 ) when the seller faced
no strategic uncertainty about the buyer's behavior. The cyclical pricing
behavior predicted in the series (i) experiments constitutes the equilibrium
price stickiness that we propose. However, the series (ii) experiments are an
important "check" on the model's theoretical consistency. The series (iii)
experiments were designed to permit strategic uncertainty. Thus, the seller
and the buyer had no information about how their counterpart would make
decisions other than the information contained in the instructions and their
observations of decisions as the game progressed. 22 Finally, we elicited sell-
21 All subjects in series (i) experiments were inexperienced (i.e., had never participated
in an experiment of this type before), and all subjects in the remaining experiments had
participated in one series (i) experiment.
22In Appendix C we report three pilot experiments with inexperienced sellers and real
buyers where h > j-2^ so equilibrium prices have persistent cycles. Subjects were told that
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ers' beliefs about the unit's next value in each experiment, but subjects were
not paid for their belief reports so the w' data are only suggestive. Statistical
analysis of all data are reported in Appendix D.
6.1 Inexperienced Sellers-Simulated Buyers: Cycles
The results from the series (i) experiments are reported in Figures 1 through
6. Figures la through 6a contain contract prices and rejections when h > T37,
where h = $2.50 in Figure 1 and h = $2.20 in the remainder. Theory (P3 )
predicts persistent cycling and all results are consistent with this prediction.
In Figures la, 2a, 3a, and 5a the true value of the first unit was low. The
seller offered a high price for unit 1, the buyer rejected the offer, and the
seller immediately offered the low price for the next trade. 23 In Figures 4a
and 6a the true value of the first unit was high. The seller offered a high
price for unit 1, the buyer accepted the offer, and the seller maintained the
high price offer until it was rejected. There was variance among the sellers in
Z, the length of low price offers. The theoretical prediction is 6 periods when
h = $2.50 and 9 periods when h = $2.20. 24 The observed period length of the
first cycle of low price offers reported in Figure la, where h = $2.50, is 2. The
length of the first cycle of low price offers in Figures 2a through 6a, where
h = $2.20, is 3, 5, 5, 4 and 3 respectively. In general, the data in Figures la
through 6a correspond to the theoretical price level predictions, the length
of the low price cycles are shorter than the theoretical L prediction, and the
length of the high cycles is consistent with the theoretical prediction (cf.,
there was a 5 percent chance that the experiment would terminate each period, but that
when one experiment ended they might rotate roles and participate in a new experiment
depending on time constraints. Possible continuation undermined the random termination
rule, so the pilots do not accurately test the theory. We report them for completeness.
23AU sellers offered a low price that was "behaviorally consistent" with the theoretical
equilibrium prediction of p; = 1 because in experimental markets subjects often require a
commission of $0.05 to $0.10 to induce them to trade zero profit units.
24Use the definition of L from Section 4.1 to compute these predictions where w' follows
from the Bayesian updating rule in Section 3 and w* follows from z; in Section 4.1.
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Appendix D). Sellers' earnings were $59.23, $36.40, $16.89, $49.40, $39.40,
and $43.00 respectively.
Figures lb through 6b report sellers' (unpaid) beliefs that the unit's value
in the next period will be high: w' = w(\ — a) + (1 — w)a. The equilibrium
predictions in the Figures are derived from the four belief situations delin-
eated in Section 3. The seller's critical belief is w' = .388 in Figure lb and
w* = .442 in Figures 2b through 6b, where w" is marked by an asterisk on
each of the figures. 25 The reports are generally consistent with the theoreti-
cal beliefs in cases (i), (ii), and (iv), but are less consistent in case (iii) where
Bayesian updating is required (cf., Appendix D).
6.2 Inexperienced Sellers-Simulated Buyers: pi = 1
The results from the series (ii) experiments are reported in Figures 7 and 8,
where h = $1.50 in both cases. Theory (Ps ) predicts price convergence to
pi with probability one, and p\ — 1. Experiment 7 lasted for 24 periods and
Experiment 8 lasted for 39 periods. Appendix D indicates that the data are
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Figure 7a indicates that the seller
posted a high price (ph. = $1.01) in periods 11 and 19, a deviation from (Ps ),
but all other decisions correspond to (Ps ). The price decisions in Figure 8a
correspond exactly to the pricing behavior predicted by theory. The sellers'
profits were $24.51 in Experiment 7 and $45.50 in Experiment 8. Figures 7b
and 8b report the seller's actual and equilibrium beliefs, where w' = .655. 26
Appendix D indicates that the sellers' (unpaid) belief reports are consistent
with the theoretical predictions in cases (i), (ii), and (iv), but not (iii).
25This follows from the computation of z\ in Section 4.2.
26This follows from the computation of z\ in Section 4.2.
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6.3 Experienced Sellers-Real Buyers: Cycles
The results from the series (iii) experiments are reported in Figures 9 through
11 for h > j^j, where h = $2.20 in Experiments 9 and 10 and h = $2.50
in Experiment 11. Theory (Ps ) predicts persistent cycling. 27 Experiment 9
lasted 13 periods and the price data are reported in Figure 9a. There was
one value transition: the first 7 units were low and the remainder were high.
The seller posted the low price for the first unit and the buyer accepted,
an equilibrium answer. The seller posted high prices for two of the next
three units, a deviation from equilibrium strategy (Ps ), and was rejected, an
equilibrium answer. The seller posted the equilibrium low price thereafter
(for 8 periods), consistent with the equilibrium L prediction of 9. The seller's
profit was $10 and the buyer's profit was $7.20. The buyer always followed
equilibrium strategy (A), even when he/she received zero profit on a trade.
The seller's (unpaid) belief reports were not consistent with the theoretical
w' predictions. See Appendix D.
Experiment 10 lasted for 63 periods and the price data are reported in
Figure 10a. The buyer frequently deviated from equilibrium strategy (Pb),
and this appears to have severely impaired the seller's ability to learn the
realizations of the Markov Process. The buyer's behavior may be explained
by two factors. First, subjects in market experiments often require a com-
mission of $0.05 to $0.10 to induce them to trade zero profit units. Thus,
the "behaviorally acceptable" equilibrium low price may have been $0.90.
Inspection of the data reveals that the buyer accepted only 8 trades and re-
jected 55. The lowest price the seller offered was $0.90 on two occasions, and
the buyer accepted this price both times. The buyer accepted $0.99 on five
occasions when the unit's value was high and once (in the last period) when
27
A11 subjects had participated in a series (i) experiment: In Experiment 9 the seller
was in Experiment 1 and the buyer was in Experiment 5; in Experiment 10 the seller was
in Experiment 2 and the buyer was in Experiment 4; and in Experiment 11 the seller was
in Experiment 3 and the buyer was in Experiment 6.
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it was low. Second, the buyer's opportunity cost of deviating from equilib-
rium strategy (Pb) was small. The seller's profit was $7.74 and the buyer's
profit was $6.26. Had the buyer followed (Pb) the seller would have earned
$65.06 in additional profit but the buyer would have earned only $0.95 in
additional profit. 28 The seller's (unpaid) belief reports were not consistent
with the theoretical w' predictions. See Appendix D.
Experiment 11 lasted for 41 periods and the price data are reported in
Figure 11. The seller's low price eventually settled at $0.75, mid-way be-
tween the theoretical equilibrium price of $1 and the "equal profit split" low
price of $0.50. The seller's high price appeared to settle at $1.25, the "equal
profit split" price when the unit's value is high. The length of the seller's low
price offer ranged between 3 and 1 1 periods, but was 6 periods on average
(excluding the final sequence of low prices), consistent with the theoretical
L prediction when h = $2.50. The buyer deviated from equilibrium strategy
(Pb) in periods 3, 8, 9, 10, and 15, but his/her behavior was otherwise con-
sistent with the theory. The seller's profit was $24.75, the buyer's profit was
$24.25, and the values were equally split between high and low outcomes.
The seller's (unpaid) belief reports were generally not consistent with the
theoretical predictions for w'. See Appendix D.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops theory and laboratory experiments designed to study
"price stickiness" in posted price (retail) markets. Our theory indicates that
observed prices that appear to be sticky may in fact be generated by rational
equilibrium learning about an underlying stochastic process. Although prices
are "set" for long periods of time, price stickiness is distinct from persistence
in the underlying process. Equilibrium price stickiness occurs when the seller
2 The asymmetry in foregone profits stems from the seller's aggressive pricing strategy
(i.e., $0.99 and $2.10) and the buyer's unusually large number of low values (49/63).
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occasionally and intentionally foregoes trade in order to learn the realizations
of the Markov Process that determine the unit's value. The data from lab-
oratory experiments are generally consistent with the theory (cf., Appendix
D). Unlike previous studies, the theory and experiments provide a frame-
work in which potential sluggishness in price adjustment can be measured
precisely. We find little evidence that contract prices are inflexible down-
ward, a result that is consistent with findings by Carlton (1986) for various
naturally occurring markets. 29 Indeed, the fact that price changes may occur
before, during, or after value transitions indicates that pricing behavior (i.e.,
equilibrium price stickiness) is intimately related to rational expectations.
Because price stickiness in our model is caused by differential information,
the analysis provides no support for countercyclical macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion policy. Recall that L, the length of low price cycles, is determined by
equilibrium beliefs, which are in turn determined by the primitives of the
model: a, /, h, and 8. Indeed, if countercyclical stabilization policies affect
the stochastic structure of the economy (a) they may be counterproductive
because as the degree of persistence in the process is reduced (i.e., a ap-
proaches 1/2) the seller's incentive to learn the demand shocks is reduced.
When the seller has no incentive to extract information from the buyer, it
is optimal for the seller to revert to simple monopoly pricing. This clearly
reduces the buyer's welfare. However, a complete analysis of optimal govern-
ment policy in this environment is a topic for future research.
Several other extensions and applications of the analysis are also possi-
ble. The model can be easily extended to the case of a single seller and
multiple buyers, where buyers are randomly chosen to "shop" each period.
29In series (i) and (ii) experiments where the seller knew the simulated buyer was fol-
lowing strategy (A), prices were never inflexible downward or sluggish: The seller took
rejection of ph as a perfect signal of a value transition. In series (iii) experiments, "sluggish
adjustment" was observed once in Experiment 9 (in period 3); seven times in Experiment
10 (in periods 54 through 60) after persistent deviation by the buyer from (Pb)\ and eight
times in Experiment 11 in periods 2, 4, 9, 10, 20, 33, 36, and 37.
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In addition, our arguments are applicable to "posted bid" markets where a
single seller (with costs that follow a two-state Markov Process) and multiple
buyers (with known values for a single unit of a good) trade. The equilib-
rium strategies for this game predict similar episodes of equilibrium price
stickiness. The introduction of multiple sellers in the posted offer market
is an interesting but difficult problem in this setting that remains for future
research. The unpaid belief data elicited in the experiments suggest that this
may be a fruitful environment for studying expectation formation (cf., Keane
and Runkle (1990) for a discussion of the difficulty of testing rationality in
naturally occurring markets). Finally, the purpose of the paper was to study
seller pricing behavior when rational learning of demand shocks was possible.
However, the series (iii) experiments suggest that further study of how agents
learn optimal strategies in this environment is warranted.
8 Appendix A
The function (•): [0, 1] -» [0, 1] is defined by w = (1 - 2a)w + a. Let (•)', for
i = 1,2,..., denote its ?'th iterate. Let the function
(
: ):[a,l — a] —* [0,1]
denote the inverse of ( : ), i.e., w = (w — a)(l — 2a)-1 , and let ( : )\ for i =
1,2, ... , denote its *th iterate.
Consider first the seller's problem. The seller faces a buyer with a policy
[Pb ) given by
.
.
. f Y if either p < »/; or: p < Ph and v = h.A{w,p,v) =
\
< i\ otherwise.
The seller's optimal policy (Ps ) is determined by the solution to the Seller's
Dynamic Programming Problem, specified in Section 3.1. Recall that Ps is
given by the function:
, v f Ph if w > w*;
P(w) = <
{ pi II w < w .
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Lemma A.l. For a given answer policy of the buyer, the value function of
the seller exists, is continuous, and gives a policy of the form Ps .
Proof. We can write the functional equation which defines the value of
the seller as:
Vs {w) = max{p, + 6Va(w); (1 - w)6V.{a) + w\ph + 6V9 (l -a)]}
The right hand side of this equation defines a map from continuous functions,
uniformly bounded above by ph{l — S)~ x and below by zero, into the same
space. Therefore a unique fixed point exists. We now prove that the policy
has the stated form.
For simplicity, denote two functions / and g by:
f{w) = pi + SVs (w)\ and g{w) = (1 — w)SVs (a) + wph + wSVs (l — a).
Note that Vs (w) = ma,x{f(w),g(w)}, and that /, g are continuous. Since
/(0) > #(0)i /U) < ^7(1), there exists a non-empty set of u/s such that
f(w) = g(w). We now prove that this set is a singleton. By a standard
argument, Vs is concave and so is /, while g is linear. Hence, the set of
intersection points is a closed interval, in the interior of (0,1) because of
the inequalities at the boundary. Let w" denote the right extreme of this
interval, i.e., w" = ma.x {w: f(w) > g{w)}. Let A = 8Vs (a), B = ph +
6[Vs(l — a) — Vs (a)]; now for any w E (max(0, w°), w"), one can easily find
f'(w) = 6(1 — 2a)B < B = g'{z). Hence the interval is the singleton {w~}.
Lemma A. 2. For a given price policy of the seller, the value function of the
buyer exists, is continuous from the right, and gives a policy of the form P\>.
Proof, For the (fixed) value w* in the buyer's policy, let w
x
= uV*, for
i = 0,1,2,.... Note that there is only a finite number of non-negative w t
values. Then define the function space 5^:
5* = {Vh : [0, 1] x {ph,Pi} x {h,l}: Vb(w, •, •) is continuous for every w G [0, 1];
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V(-;p;v) is right continuous and continuous on [u;,-!, u;,-) for every i, and
every p, v}.
With the topology induced by the supremum norm, this is a complete met-
ric space. Consider now the functional equation defining the buyer's value
function (see Section 3.2). The right hand side defines all operations from
S^ into 5* . For instance, when p = p t , v = h, the corresponding equation is:
(h-p, + 6[{\ - a)Vb {w,p(w),h) + aVb {w,p(w),l)];
Vh{w, ph. n) = max <
r
The other three cases define three similar equations. A standard application
of the Contraction Mapping Theorem to space 5* gives a unique fixed point.
9 Appendix B
We now prove the existence of a sequential equilibrium in stationary strate-
gies (i.e. for strategies which depend on only v and w ). An equilibrium may
fail to exist for some values of the parameters, but the following parameter
restrictions ensure existence: Either
Ml -6(l-a)] + 6(l-a)> T±;orh< T^ (A).
The intuition behind condition (A) stems from the buyer and seller's tradeoff.
Observe that h — 1 is the surplus that can be divided when v = h. When
the surplus is very small the seller has no incentive to pay the cost (i.e. the
possibility of losing a trade) to acquire information about the unit's value.
If (A) is not satisfied, and h < 2, then an equilibrium (in pure strategies)
does not exist. It is easy to compute that for any value of (<5, a) 6 (0, 1) x
[0, |) the set of h's for which a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist
is a non-empty interval [jr^ mm{h{8 : a), 2}], with h{6,a) the solution of
h[l — 6(1 — q)](1 — a) + 6(1 — a) 2 — 1=0. Even worse, one can show (we
omit the proof):
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Proposition B.l: If the game with parameters (8, a, h) has no pure strategy
equilibrium, then for a non-empty interval [73-,^'] the game has no mixed
strategy equilibrium.
From the proof of the main theorem of this section (i.e. Theorem B.3) we
shall derive more precise conditions on the dynamic behavior of the equilib-
rium paths (recall the results on equilibrium price paths from Section 4.1):
Proposition B.2: If f(h,6,a) £ [(1 - a) -1
,
2], or h < (1 - a)" 1 , then
the game has an equilibrium where only p = 1 is eventually posted; and
if f(h,6,a) > 2 then the only equilibria are of the cyclic type (i.e. the
equilibrium with w" > |).
We now state the existence result.
Theorem B.3: Assume (A). Then the game has an equilibrium in stationary
strategies (see section 3) that is characterized by the triple (w* ,pi,ph)-
Proof: We show in Section 4.1 that in equilibrium pi = I = 1. Now consider
the composition of two functions: W* : [1, h] —> [0, 1] and P* : [0, 1] —» [1, h\;
a fixed point p" of this composition gives an equilibrium triple (W*(p"), l,p*).
The proof will show that such p* exist. To clarify the exposition, some steps
in the proof are stated and proved separately.
The function W* gives for any p^ £ [1, /i], the optimal threshold belief for
a seller facing a buyer with optimal policy A(p,v) = {V if either p < 1 or
p < Ph and v — h}. Notice that this policy does not depend on w. From the
first order condition from the buyer's problem it is not difficult to show that
the function W*(-) is continuous and decreasing in ph- 30 Let now p\,p2 be
defined by: W*{p\) — 1— a, W*(p2 ) = \. Note that pi,/>2 are determined by
(<5, a) alone. Since W* is decreasing, and w* > ,*~f , we have 1 < pi < p2 \
in fact we can easily compute that p x = tz^, Pi = 2 (independent of 8).
30We thank A. Wolinsky (1991, Private Communication).
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We now define the function P". First, let Vb(w, v; w",p) denote the buyer's
value when the seller's belief is w, the unit's value is v, the seller follows
pricing policy p(w) = {1 if w < w*, p \( w > />*}, and the buyer follows
answer policy A{p',v) = {y iff p' < 1 or p' < p and v = h}. 31 We next
specify an incentive compatibility condition for the buyer:
= h — p + 6{(l - a)Vb{\ - a, h\ w",p) + aVb (l - a, /; w
m
,p)}
-6{(l-a)Vh (a,h;w\p) + aVh (a.l;w',p)} (ICC)
This equality must hold in equilibrium: the (ICC) must be non-negative to
induce the buyer to truthfully reveal when the unit's value is high given a
high price offer; and it cannot be strictly positive or the seller would have an
incentive to increase the high price offer.
We now dispense with a trivial case:
Lemma B.4: If h < pi, then (W*(h), l.h) is an equilibrium.
Proof: At (W*{h),h), the (ICC) is satisfied because Vh {-,vAV'(h).h) is
constant over [0, 1 — a]; and W(h) > 1 — a, so the critical belief is never
reached on any path. //
Lemma B.5: For any // £ [p\Ji] a p £ [pi*h) exists such that (ICC)
is satisfied when the seller's pricing policy is w" = W'(p'). and p = po is
satisfied.
Proof: It suffices to consider separately the two cases p' £ [p2<h] and
p' £ [PiiP2]- m both cases the proof follows by considering the value of
the function of p defined by the right hand side of (ICC) at p x and h, and
then using the continuity of the function. //
We know from Lemma B.5 that if h > p2 then P"(W"(h)) < h. Since we
shall prove that P" o \V~ is increasing on [pl5 h], it is critical to determine if
31 We will often suppress w" or p when no confusion arises.
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P*(W"(1 — a)) = P"{p\) is larger or smaller than p\. Computation of (ICC)
at (1 — a,pi) gives
P*(l - a) = h[l - 6(1 - a)] + 6(1 - a).
Consider now any w" £ [a, |), and let the integer & be defined by w* E
[d fc
,
c/'"1
" 1
). The seller's policy can now be reformulated as a function of k as
follows: For an initial belief a, offer p = 1 for k periods, then offer p — ph
until the buyer refuses the offer; in this case begin the cycle again.
The only parameter relevant for the buyer is the integer k. More precisely,
for any pair w*, i = 1,2 of seller threshold beliefs, such that
w*£[ak ,ak+1 ),i = 1,2 (A.l)
the buyer's corresponding value function is the same.
Now let the value of k and p = Ph be fixed. The buyer's value function
depends on v and w, and for fixed v is piecewise constant in w. Similarly,
the function P* is piecewise constant over the intervals [d\d !+1 ), and right
continuous. We can now easily provide an analytic solution for the buyer's
value function. To this end, consider the following notation:
If w G [a',Q' !+1 ), i + 1 < k, then denote the value over this interval by
x
2i+1 (k,p) iiv = h and by x2i+2 {k,p) if v = /;
If w £ [a fc , 1], then denote the value by y
l {k,p) if v — h and by y
2 {k,p)
\iv = I 32
Finally, let
/ 1 — a a \
A={
\ a I — a J
I be the identity matrix, and 7 = [1 — 6(1 — a)]
-1
.
Hi = {I + 6A + ... + 6hAk)(
k
~ P\
32We shall omit the variables k,p when no confusion arises.
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(a 1 6 21 a£ 2 7(l-a)\
'
{ aS 6(1 -a) )
'
Then we easily find:
(xu x 2 ) = (7 - ^A**)- 1^? + iSkA kH°p ] (A.2)
(2/1,2/2) = 7#p° + B(I - ^A^)- 1^* + lS kA k H°p ] (A.3)
Now if we write:
6(1 -a)x 2(k,p)+6ax l (k,p) = F(k,p)
then the incentive compatibility condition is:
y
1 (k,p)-F(k,p) = (ICCk )
Lemma B.6: 0> f£(Jfc + l,p) > f£(Jfe,p), for »= 1,2, lb = 0,1,2,....
Proof: Let EVo= k (EVo= i) denote the expectation of a random variable, con-
ditional on the initial value being high (low). It is easily derived that:
x* = ft-l +^ =,g^ f-l)}+^
4 = E^iJ^ffa - l)} + S k+l {pk+l C/ih P)QS + 7foJ] + (1 - pk+1 )6xk2 },
where Pk (pk ) is the probability that the kth value is high (low), conditional
onu = h(v = /); in fact, Pk = \[l+(l-2a) k ] andp* = §[l-(l-2a)*]. The
final result follows from differentiation and an easy estimate of the terms. //
Lemma B.7: fp [y'(k + l,p) - F(k + l,p)] < ^(M - F{k,p)] < for
k = 0,1,2,..., and pe [l,h].
Proof: The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: |^(0,p)-F(0,p)]<0.
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This is proved by a direct computation, and an estimate left to the reader.
Step 2: ^[y\k + l,p)- F(k+ l,p)] <
^[y
l {k,p) - F(k,p)], for k = 0, 1, . .
.
and /? G [1, /*].
Notice that in fact
^[y\k,p)-F(k,p)] = -1 +[a2627 -6(l-a))^ + [a6-a(l-a)627]^.
op Op Op
Since the two coefficients in the square brackets have negative sign, the claim
follows immediately from Lemma B.6. //
Lemma B.8: %{k,p) > for i = 1,2 and p G [1,/?].
Proof: Note first that x l'(fc,p) = x*'(Jfe, 1)+J? ^(k,p')dp', for i = 1,2 and p €
[1,/i], since from (.4.2) we have that x'{k,-) is a continuously differentiable
function of p. But it can easily be shown that
[x 1 (k, \),x 2 {k, 1)) = ({l-S(l-a)-S 2a 2 j}- x (h-l),oS1 {l-S(l-a)-S 2a 2 1 }- l (h-l
where both values are independent of k. The result follows immediately from
Lemma B.6, which gives '^f-(k,p) increasing in k for i = 1,2. //
Lemma B.9: The function k —* y 1 (k,p) — F{k\p) is decreasing in k.
Proof: From the expression for (x 1 (k,p), x 2 (k.p)) we have that
1 fl„2\J r1/« \ i < » ii rO/-0 i^-i ^ *^ r O r^O t /- 1 ^-* X
— [y'ilcp) - F(k,p)] = {«H 21 - (1 - a)S}— + [a 2 * 2 7 (l - a) - a*] .
where we consider the functions defined on the integers as extended func-
tions over the real numbers. Since the coefficients in the square brackets are
negative, our claim follows from Lemma B.8. //
Proposition B.10: Equality {ICCk) defines implicitly p as an increasing
function of k.
Proof: From Lemmata B.7 and B.9 the function (k,p) —> y
1 (k,p) — F(k,p)
is decreasing in k and p. The claim follows. //
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Proposition B.ll: The function p —> P*(W*{p)) is: (i) increasing on \p2 , h],
(ii) constant on [/? 1 ,p2 )i and (hi) continuous at p2 .
Proof: (i) follows immediately from the fact that W* is decreasing and P*
is decreasing (from Theorem B.3). (ii) follows from the fact that for any
p £ [pi,p2), W*(p) E (1/2, 1 — q], and the terms in the (ICC) for the buyer
are constant for this set of beliefs. Finally, (iii) follows because it is easily
checked that:
lim Vb (w, v\ w", p) = Vb {w, v\ -, p)
for w E {a, 1 — a}, v E {/, h} and p E [1, /i]. This concludes the proof.
10 Appendix C: Pilots
Price data for pilot experiments are reported in Figures 12, 13, and 14. 33
The data in Figure 12 display persistent cycles and state dependent pricing
as predicted by theory. The experiment lasted for 150 market periods with 4
role rotations. The first "phase' 1 lasted for 92 periods, and the true value of
the first unit was low. The seller posted declining high prices for the first six
units and was rejected on all trades. The seller then posted a low price for two
periods that was accepted, but again posted the high price for the next four
periods and was rejected. The seller posted a low price for the next twelve
periods and was rejected in five of the twelve periods. The subjects often
deviated from equilibrium strategies (Ps ) and {Pb ), and the data suggest that
they may have been engaged in an implicit bargaining process. Eventually
they tacitly agreed on the "equal profit split" low price of $0.50 and the
33A11 pilots had inexperienced sellers and real buyers, where h = $2.50. No beliefs
were elicited from sellers. We effectively undermined the random termination parameter,
8, necessary for the theoretical p, w" , and L predictions because subjects were told we
might begin a new experiment if the current one ended early. However, they were given
no explicit information about the number of subsequent experiments, so <5 was not well
specified. We report benchmark predictions for 8 — .05 for completeness.
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"equal profit split" high price of $1.25. Thus, subjects conformed to the
two-state cyclical pricing rule, but the level of pi was below the theoretical
equilibrium prediction, and the actual length of low prices was somewhat
lower than the L = 6 predicted by theory. The number of non-equilibrium
buyer rejections was dramatically lower in the second half of the experiment.
The data in Figure 13 are also generally consistent with (Ps ) by the
second half of the experiment. The experiment lasted for 75 periods with
3 role rotations. Subjects tacitly agreed on a low price of $0.90 which is
behaviorally consistent with the theory, and a high price in the range $1.25-
$1.75. The data suggest that the subjects again may have engaged in a
bargaining process.
Finally, the data in Figure 14 are strikingly inconsistent with the predic-
tions of the theory when / = $1, h = $2.50, and 6 = 0.05. The experiment
lasted for 94 periods with 4 role rotations. The seller and the buyer tacitly
agreed to post and always accept a single price offer of $0.95. However, the
theoretical analysis in Section 4 indicates that the cyclical nature of the op-
timal contract price path depends on both the Markov Process and the fact
that the experiment may terminate (with probability 0.05) after each market
period. Because we indicated to subjects that even if the experiment ended
they might switch roles and participate in a new experiment, it appears that
they (quite rationally) ignored the random termination rule. If the market
is certain to last for many periods, it is optimal for subjects to agree on a
single price because the invariant measure of the Markov Process is 1/2 (over
many market periods about half of the values will be high and half will be
low, so the expected exchange surplus each period is $1.75). A fixed price of
$0.95 gives the seller a certain profit of $0.95 each period and the buyer an
average profit of $0.80 each period.
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11 Appendix D: Statistical Analysis
Table 1 reports measures of predictive success (cf., Selten (1991)) for five
testable implications of the theory. The theory predicts a "high or low" seller
pricing strategy (P5 ), a "yes" or "no" buyer answer strategy (-P&), lengths of
low (L) and high (H) price offers, and the four case belief mechanism (i),
(ii), (iii), and (iv). Eleven experiments were conducted. The measure of
predictive success is an instrument that assesses the statistical usefulness of
an area theory. 34 Let m denote the measure, r denote the hit rate of a theory
(the relative frequency of correct predictions), and a denote the area (relative
size) of the predicted subset compared with the set of all possible outcomes.
Define m = r — a, where m G [— 1,+1] in general.
Table 1 reports m's for various testable implications of the theory. For
example, in Experiment 1, m for (Ps ) is computed as follows: r = 32/37,
where 32 is the number of successful predictions and 37 is the total number
of outcomes; and a = 150/251, where 150 is the number of p^ £ [1.01,2.50]
and 251 is the total number of prices in [0, 2.51]. 35 In Experiment 9, m for
(Pb) is computed as follows: r = 11/13 and a — 1/2 (since there are two
possible answers). The entries for L and H are simply the hit rates for the
theory. Finally the m for belief cases (i) through (iv) are computed under
the assumption that a belief report is a success if it is 0.10 above or below
the theoretical level. Thus, the maximum possible m for beliefs is 0.80. NA
in Table 1 indicates "not applicable."
34Area theories for the prediction of experimental results delineate regions of predicted
outcomes within the set of all possible outcomes.
35 For (P, ) the theory's hit rate is high but the accuracy is low. When h = $2.50
(Experiments 1 and 11) the maximum possible m for (F, ) is 0.30. When h = $2.20
(Experiments 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10) the maximum possible m for (P, ) is 0.46. When
h — $1.50 (Experiments 7 and 8) the maximum possible m is 0.67. Most m in column
(Fj) are close to the maximum possible value. The maximum possible m for (F(,) is 0.50.
34
Table 1:
Experiment Ps Pb L H (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1 0.26 NA 0.00 1.00 0.76 0.40 0.47 NA
2 0.31 NA 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 NA
3 0.37 NA 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.47 NA
4 0.39 NA 0.50 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.47 NA
5 0.23 NA 0.17 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.58 0.80
6 0.31 NA 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 NA
7 0.59 NA 0.87 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.26 NA
8 0.67 NA 1.00 1.00 0.80 NA -0.08 0.80
9 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.50 NA -0.20 0.30 NA
10 0.17 -0.50 0.00 0.00 NA -0.20 0.37 0.13
11 -0.45 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.53 0.75 o.so
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